After entering Montenegro, Zinchuk described the Montenegrin border police on his telegram-channel as incompetent for failing to stop him, even though he is subject to EU sanctions. He must have known that his media activities would come under the scrutiny of the Montenegrin authorities. Evidently, he wanted to provoke his own public failure. This is not Zinchuk’s only setback; in late September, employees of his channel were deported from the Czech Republic. It can be assumed that he intended to demonstrate that his network in Europe is being monitored and cannot be used for covert operations
On October 9, Russian propagandist Michael Zinchuk, his wife and three employees were deported from Montenegro, where they had arrived just two days before. Zinchuk operates several media projects, including his main telegram-channel “Rybar” with almost 1,4 million subscribers (telegram-channels are not widely used in Montenegro, but extremely popular in Russia). Zinchuk, despite his Ukrainian last name, is one of the most influential professional warmongers, who calls for fighting the war until the destruction of the independent Ukrainian state. Moreover, he is considered to be in charge of spreading messages that reflect the real opinion of hawks in the inner circle of Russian president Vladimir Putin.
There is one question, which remains unanswered: why did Zinchuk decide to come to Montenegro. He explained that he had intended to make a documentary about economic and social difficulties that in his opinion, Montenegro would face after joining the EU. But that explanation contradicts his behavior. Soon after entering Montenegro, he published a post in his channel, in which he insulted the Border Police of Montenegro, which he called incompetent for not stopping him, though he is under the EU sanctions. Such a declaration appears to be extremely stupid, because Zinchuk must have known that his media activity would be observed by the Montenegrin law-enforcement agencies. Instead of trying to disguise himself as tourist as long as possible, he started with mocking the government agency, on which depends his stay in the country.
The only possible answer is that he came to be arrested and deported. He knew that would be defended on the highest level. Spokesperson of Russian ministry of foreign affairs Maria Zakharova personally coordinated the activity of Russian embassies in Serbia and Montenegro in support of Zinchuk. The Russian broadcaster RT and media group Rossiya Segodnya, which target the audience outside Russia, highlighted news about Zinchuk’s arrest, because their editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan issue a direct instruction to someone to do it. So Zinchuk did not have much to have much to fear. And he obviously wanted to fail publicly.
By the way, it was at least Zinchuk’s failure in the recent weeks. In the end of September the employees of Zinchuk’s channel were deported from the Czech Republic, after they had too frankly talked with local journalist, who happened to investigate their activity in Europe. What seemed just a silly mistake can be regarded in another light now.
It is possible to make a suggestion. Zinchuk wanted to show that his net in Europe is being closely watched and cannot be used for undercover operations. He and his employees are easily identified and exposed. It has been reported that after the election defeat of former Hungarian president Victor Orban, there has been a radical shift in the approach to the goals and means of the undercover activity in Europe. Supporting pro-Russian political forced has been recognized to be ineffective. It has been decided that more serious effects on public opinion can be achieved through social destabilization by actions of political radicals and acts of sabotage. Zinchuk might want to avoid participation of the members of his disinformation net in Europe in the execution of such plans. And the prospect of the implementation has become stronger in the last weeks. Because Russian president Vladimir Putin seems to believe that he has come close to making a deal with the US, which will give him a free hand in undermining the EU. In one of his recent speeches he revealed that he expects the EU to fall apart in the near future, but assured that he is not going to do anything to make it happen faster. Based on experience of Putin’s long rule, it can be taken for granted, that if he publicly assures of his inaction, he has already decided to increase his activity.
Vladimir Putin is making the same mistake in his perception of the US president Donald Trump, as he made regarding his predecessors Barack Obama and Joe Biden. He thought that Obama’s feeble reaction on the annexation of the Crimea and instigation of the military conflict on Donbas proved that the US had no intentions and resources to impede Russia. It turned out that Obama’s administration just wanted the Kremlin to get stuck in the conflict in Ukraine to disrupt the economic cooperation between Russia and Germany (and the EU as a whole). Putin believed that Biden’s administration would not impose serious sanctions on Russia and provide meaningful military assistance to Ukraine. And he was wrong again.
Biden’s sanctions were aimed at the restraining Russian economic development, not at the inflicting immediate damage on Russian economy. Due to that, Vladimir Putin was confident for some time that American sanctions were not working, and Russian propaganda was eager to demonstrate it. Now, the Kremlin wants to American sanctions to be lifted. And Putin expects Trump to do that, because he regards Trump as a potential ally in the confrontation with the EU.
Of course, there is no love lost between the European Commission and the incumbent US administration. However, the American president does not want to destroy the EU. He wants to control it and obtain economic concessions from it. Putin, as many people who grew up in the USSR, do not believe that political systems of the Western countries are grounded on established procedures and formal rules. Unlike Russia, their governments do not need external expansion to achieve a legitimate rule, they already have it. So the goals of their expansion, even if they look unattainable like in the case of the current US administration, are grounded on rational reasons.
Trump wants to make a profitable deal with Putin, but the American president could establish control over the energy supply of the EU, even without Moscow’s assistance. And Russia cannot help him in reaching his other goals, like reaching global dominance through the leadership in the AI systems or gaining control over global trade routes. So Trump tries to persuade Putin to come to an agreement and give US corporations a share in Russian oil and gas export. And the American president has nothing against putting pressure on Ukraine in order to facilitate negotiations with the Kremlin. But he cannot allow Putin to destabilize the EU, because the US president needs the European consumption of oil and gas remains high. And it means that the European economy should keep functioning stably.
The US administration has already started to create grounds for justification of the upcoming cooperation with Russia. There can be no other goal of the so called “diesel deal” between Washington and Moscow, which was announced on October 9. The amount of diesel that Russia is supposed to deliver to the US under this agreement is insignificant. It has been stated that Russia will deliver 300 thousand tons in October, 500 thousand tons in November, 1 million tons after that and additionally 3 million tons. The US daily consumption of diesel is 500-520 thousand tons. Therefore, Russian export cannot make a big difference.
Moreover, the US exports approximately 180 thousand tons of diesels per day. So the temporarily ban on export would increase the amount of diesel on the American market much more than Russian import.
However, Trump does not need diesel; he needs an example of Russian willingness to help America in the time of need. He has already thanked Russia for its readiness to supply diesel to the US, and scolded Ukraine for ignoring American request to stop attacks on Russian refineries. It should be noted that these attacks could have been terminated, if the US ceased providing Ukrainian forces with space intelligence data. Trump does not seem to care much about Russian refineries. But he managed to demonstrate, that Ukrainian president Volodymir Zelensky pays no attention to American demands. So there is no reason to sacrifice American interests, refusing from profitable cooperation with Vladimir Putin, who proved to be an American friend.
And if the cooperation between Moscow and Washington is established, it will bring huge results. It was reported for the first time in September, and almost officially confirmed on October 8, that the Kremlin and the US administration have been discussing a handover of the North Stream pipeline system to American corporations.
Last year, speaking at the UN General Assembly, Donald Trump urged Europe to abandon Russian gas. The US administration is now planning to profit from its return, but now it will belong to American corporations, and Trump will have nothing against it.
Germany eventually became dependent on Russian gas and dragged a large part of Europe into this trap. Now, after the EU made painful efforts to overcome this dependence, Donald Trump established control over the EU energy market. According to the data, 92% of German and 59% of the EU LNG imports come from the US. If the agreement with Russia is achieved (and it seems to be quite probable), American corporations will supply also pipeline gas to Europe. Moreover, Russian LNG will be certainly included in the deal, because its supply to Europe can be interrupted at any moment, if Trump decides to implement the law that gives him an opportunity to impose sanctions on the countries that import Russian oil and gas.
By the way, American corporations can also take part in the production of Russian oil and its export to Europe, because the Russia cannot increase exploitation of its Arctic oilfields, unless American sanctions on the equipment for the oil industry are not removed.
The show that Trump performed to justify cooperation with Putin can turn out to be very profitable. Besides, the US administration will tighten its grip on the European economy. At the same time, the EU security will be threatened by growing Russian activity, the destruction of the Ukrainian cities will continue and moral norms will be once again rejected by the current US administration.
This dependence exposes Europe to the risk of high costs, price fluctuations, and geopolitical pressure,” the study states. The more Trump controls Europe’s energy supply, the greater the likelihood that the US president will leverage this source of power elsewhere. The national security strategy paper released back in November explicitly spoke of a goal of US “energy dominance”—one that “enables us to project our power whenever and wherever necessary.” The US appears to have already laid the groundwork for this.
“We must acknowledge the new reality of American energy dominance under Donald Trump and view Europe’s imports with caution,” Professor Kacper Szulecki of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
He raises the prospect of a potential energy crisis, noting that EU gas reserves are currently very low, even lower than at the start of the war in Ukraine. “If a cold winter coincides with tensions with the US—leading to further price hikes and the depletion of reserves—we could face a truly dramatic energy crisis in the coming months,” Szulecki said.
“Despite the rhetorical commitment to diversification, new EU legislation paradoxically treats energy from any country other than Russia as fully diversified.”
Three-quarters entered via France in September: despite sanctions, Europe purchased nearly €8 billion worth of Russian gas in 2026. Europe continues to purchase massive quantities of Russian gas, despite the sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine. Import volumes are even reaching record highs. According to a new analysis by the German NGO Urgewald—based on data from the maritime shipping specialist Kpler—European Union ports received 12.18 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Russian Yamal project between January and September 2026. That is 9.5% more than during the same period in 2025. Over a nine-month period, no fewer than 167 shipments of Russian LNG were offloaded at European ports. That averages out to one LNG tanker every 38 hours.
Another threat looms over Russian exports. On September 18, the United States enacted the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, legislation authorizing sanctions against entities involved in the Russian LNG trade. The measure specifically targets executives of the Yamal project and foreign vessels knowingly transporting Russian LNG, as well as the owners and operators of foreign ports that accommodate vessels subject to U.S. sanctions or provide them with services.
The European Union now accounts for 85% of global deliveries from the Yamal project, which operates in the Russian Arctic. This is a significant proportion, especially given that the site’s global exports dipped slightly—by 1.3%—during the period. In other words, while Yamal shipped slightly less gas overall, Europe bought more of it. France plays a particularly significant role in these exchanges. According to Urgewald, nearly three-quarters of the Russian LNG volumes delivered to the European Union in September were received at French ports. A significant portion of this Russian gas reaches France largely because TotalEnergies holds a 20% stake in the Yamal gas project in the Russian Arctic and has a long-term contract to purchase 5 million tonnes of LNG annually. Furthermore, France possesses several LNG terminals—notably in Dunkirk and Montoir-de-Bretagne—that allow the gas to be received before potentially being transported to other European countries, such as Germany. Consequently, not all Russian gas unloaded at French ports is necessarily consumed within France.
Since April 25, 2026, imports under existing short-term contracts have been prohibited. However, according to the German NGO, the impact of this measure remains very limited.
How can the continued massive flow of Russian gas into Europe despite sanctions be explained? Quite simply because Brussels included transition periods for contracts already in place. Since April 25, 2026, Europe has banned purchases of Russian gas under short-term contracts. However, companies that signed multi-year contracts may continue to receive Russian gas until the end of 2026. The aim is to give European companies time to find alternative suppliers without causing supply disruptions or a fresh spike in prices. Consequently, a total ban on Russian LNG imports is not scheduled to take effect until January 1, 2027. This deadline could deprive Moscow of its primary market for gas produced in the Arctic. The proximity of European ports allows Russian LNG tankers to make frequent round trips. The Yamal project relies notably on Arc7-class ice-breaking vessels capable of navigating icy Arctic waters, even in winter. Urgewald is therefore calling on Europeans to go further by directly targeting the services that enable this fleet to operate.
Russian oil output is at a 17-year low: Putin wants to tap into the Arctic’s billions of barrels but relies on two vulnerable vessels. With Russian oil production set to hit a 17-year low this year, the country is banking on massive Arctic deposits to pick up the slack. Yet, behind the ambitions of the Vostok Oil project—which could eventually yield up to 2 million barrels per day—this new Russian oil route relies on a handful of vessels and infrastructure that Western nations are now seeking to undermine. According to Moscow, Russian oil production is expected to reach its lowest level in 17 years this year. As pressure from Ukraine on energy facilities shows no signs of abating, Putin is pinning his hopes on the Arctic route to revitalize oil output.
However, this strategic alternative also has vulnerabilities that the West could further exploit. The Arctic outlet is an attractive prospect, yet it also has its vulnerabilities. It is attractive because the oil deposits are colossal—particularly those associated with the Vostok Oil project in northern Siberia, around the Taymyr Peninsula. The initial ambition for this project alone was to produce up to 2 million barrels per day, equivalent to roughly 2% of global oil supply. Picture 13 fields containing resources estimated by Rosneft at some 50 billion barrels of crude oil. The complex is linked to the Bukhta Sever terminal on the Arctic coast by an oil pipeline spanning nearly 800 kilometers, with plans for a storage hub featuring around a hundred tanks. Vostok Oil: Russia’s massive Arctic oil project These Russian Arctic fields are therefore crucial to Moscow; the country is counting on them to drive a significant portion of its future oil production growth. The project has faced major delays, largely because Western sanctions have caused key international investors to withdraw.
However, the project is finally beginning to take shape: in September, for the first time, oil from Vostok Oil was exported from the new Bukhta Sever terminal. The new link is thus becoming operational—even though the reality remains far removed from the stated ambitions.
This Arctic hub is all the more important for Putin given that his energy infrastructure is under pressure from Ukrainian drones. Many refineries are within range, and the damage is extensive. In September, seven sites were put out of commission following strikes, including a refinery near Moscow operated by Gazprom.
The macroeconomic impact is beginning to be quantified: oil and gas are projected to account for just 13% of Russia’s GDP this year, down from 20% in 2022 prior to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes and Western sanctions are thus placing further pressure on a sector vital to Moscow. This underscores the importance of the Arctic as an alternative energy source—a region boasting colossal reserves where energy facilities lie beyond the reach of Ukrainian drones.
Dmitry GALKIN
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